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I. Introduction
Urban highways and urban renewal are public outputs which impose
many nonconstruction costs upon households living in the metro-
politan areas where they are located. Yet present public policies
ignore most of these costs by failing to take them into account when
planning the improvements concerned, and failing to compensate the
citizens who are compelled to bear them. This dual failure results in
very widespread injustice. Moreover, the heaviest burdens generated
by such injustice tend to fall upon citizens least able to bear them
because of their low incomes and generally restricted opportunities.
It may seem inappropriate to discuss the costs of two major gov-
ernment programs at a conference on the economics of public output.
But one man's benefit is often another man's cost. So almost every
public project produces some negative impacts on the output side as
well as the negative impact of paying for its inputs. Yet too often
public construction projects are evaluated by comparing only the bene-
fits on the output side with the costs on the input side—or at least
ignoring many significant costs generated by outputs.
NOTE. This paper is based upon a study conducted under the auspices of the
Baltimore Urban Design Concept Team and financed by several federal agencies.
The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not neces-
sarily represent the views of the members of the Baltimore Urban Design
Concept Team, the Maryland State Roads Commission, or any of the other
local, state, and federal agencies connected with the Baltimore Highway Project.'1
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This paper is aimed at remedying this imbalance concerning urban
highways and urban renewal insofar as residential households are
concerned.1 It therefore seeks to (1) identify the nonconstruction costs
which residential households are forced to bear by these two pro-
grams, (2) analyze which of these costs should be paid for by public
authorities, (3) estimate the magnitude of certain key costs for which
compensation should be paid but is not, and (4) indicate some policy
implications of the analysis.
II. The Basic Principle of Compensation
People who are forced to move from their homes because of highways
or urban renewal, or who suffer from environmental changes caused
by these public outputs, thereby sustain certain financial and other
losses. These losses are essentially personal sacrifices which they are
compelled to bear for the good of the public in general, and of the
beneficiaries of individual public projects in particular. It is therefore
the duty of the public authorities concerned to compensate them for
these sacrifices. Such compensation should place them in substantially
the same status, in terms of economic and other well-being, that they
occupied before being affected by the projects concerned.
Thus, the basic idea behind compensation consists of "making people
whole" in relation to the injuries they sustain from public projects
(other than paying their share of the input costs concerned, pre-
sumably through various taxes). Consequently, the losses imposed
upon them should be identically offset by compensation provided to
them, except to the extent that those losses are offset by the benefits
provided by the project involved.
In some cases, this basic principle must be substantially modified
in practice. Nevertheless, it is the fundamental concept on which the
law concerning compensation is based (insofar as a nonlawyer like
me can determine), and upon which my analysis will build.
1 Other similar losses are imposed upon commercial, industrial, and institu-
tional establishments by urban highways and urban renewal. Although many
of the principles discussed in this paper also apply to losses sustained by these
establishments, we have not considered any such losses or proper public policies I.
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III. The Kinds of Losses Imposed upon Residential
Households by Urban Highways and Urban
Renewal Other Than Construction Costs
The construction of major highways and urban renewal projects in
urban areas imposes three basic types of losses upon residential house-
holds living in those areas, other than the losses resulting from paying
for the costs of construction. These are (1) losses imposed upon house-
holdsdirectlydisplacedbysuchprojects,(2)lossesimposed
upon a variety of households because of uncertainty and delays
connected with clearance and construction, and (3) losses imposed
upon households not residing in the right-of-way or clearance area and
so not displaced, but nevertheless affected by the projects concerned.
These types of losses are listed on accompanying pages.
Some of the individual losses listed are relatively self-explanatory,
but others require considerable clarification. Therefore, each is dis-
cussed briefly in the following paragraphs.
Losses Imposed upon Residential Households by Displacement Itself
DISRUPTION OF ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIPS. Many house-
holds residing in any given neighborhood develop a number of well-
established relationships with other persons, places, and firms in that
area. These relationships include family ties and friendships with
others living nearby, credit relationships with stores or banks, and
habitual patterns of social and commercial intercourse. In some cases,
particularly those of elderly households, these relationships represent
the cumulative result of a large investment of time and energy in per-
sonal activity.
When these households are compelled to move, their relationships
are often disrupted. The disruption can be either minor (as when the
displaced household merely moves close by) or more serious or even
fatal to the relationships concerned (as when the displaced household
must relocate far away). The resulting losses are likely to cause the
greatest hardship for elderly people, since many no longer have the
energy or the financial means to make the new investments required
to establish similar relationships elsewhere.
-j•1
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THE KINDS OF LOSSES IMPOSED UPON RESIDENTIAL
HOUSEHOLDS BY URBAN HIGHWAY AND URBAN
RENEWAL PROJECTS (OTHER THAN PAYING
FOR CONSTRUCTION COSTS)
A. LOSSES IMPOSED UPON RESIDENTIAL HOUSEHOLDS BY DISPLACEMENT ITSELF
I. Disruption of established personal and other relationships
2. Losses due to the taking of real property
3. Losses due to home financing arrangements, especially contract buying
4. Costs of seeking alternative housing elsewhere
5. Costs of paying for alternative housing elsewhere
6. Moving costs
7. Higher operating costs of residing elsewhere
B. LOSSES IMPOSED UPON RESIDENTIAL HOUSEHOLDS BY UNCERTAINTIES AND DELAYS
8. Deterioration in the quality of life during waiting periods
9. Inability of property owners to sell property at reasonable prices during
waiting periods
10. Declines in the value of properties during waiting periods because of neigh-
borhood and individual property deterioration
11. Losses of income suffered by owners of rental property because of the de-
parture of tenants before actual taking occurs
12. Costs of maintaining property after its fair market value has been estab-
lished for purposes of litigation
C. LOSSES IMPOSED UPON RESIDENTIAL HOUSEHOLDS
NOT DIRECTLY DISPLACED BUT LOCATED IN SURROUNDING AREAS
13. Higher taxes paid because of increased city costs to counteract vandalism
and other deterioration in the area
14. Disruption of local communications through the blocking of streets
15. Reduction in the quantity and quality of commercial and other services
available in the area because they have left or been displaced
16. Reduction in employment opportunities and increased costs of traveling to
work because firms have been compelled to move elsewhere or have gone
out of business
17. Spillover effects of deterioration in the clearance areas during the waiting
periods
18. Higher rents or housing prices because of increased competition for housing
among low-income households resulting from displacement
19. Reduction in the efficiency of community facilities through
a. Loss of patronage if displacement has removed customers
b. Overcrowding if displacement has removed alternative sources of supply
(such as a local school)
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20. Losses in property values due to changes in the accessibility of various parts
of the metropolitan area
21. Losses resulting from congestion, vibration, noise, street blockage, dust, and
other negative factors involved in the process of constructing the new high-
way or urban renewal project
22. Losses in property values due to increased ugliness, noise, air pollution, or
other adverse effects of the completed highway or urban renewal project
To a great extent, losses of this type are psychological rather than
economic.2 Moreover, they are often encountered in the normal process
of urban living even when no displacement by public projects occurs.
Therefore, moves caused by displacement resulting from public projects
sometimes merely represent an acceleration in time of moves that
would occur anyway. In such cases, the losses accurately attributable
to the public improvements concerned are only those due to accelerat-
ing the time of movement by whatever period is concerned.
LOSSES DUE TO THE TAKING OF REAL PROPERTY. The creation
of urban highways and renewal projects involves public acquisition
of many parcels of land, both vacant and improved, for the loss of
which the owners are compensated by the government. Normally,
they are paid the "fair market value" of the real properties taken.
Fair market value is defined as the money price which a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller under current market conditions if neither
was under any compulsion to complete a transaction, both were fully
informed about the nature of the property and its environment, and
the property was exposed to the market for a reasonable length of
time. In essence, fair market value is determined by establishing what
the property concerned would have brought if sold on the free market
at the time the legal proceeding is brought against the owner.
LOSSES DUE TO HOME FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS. Urban
highways and renewal projects are frequently located in relatively low-
income neighborhoods. In such neighborhoods, households are often
purchasing homes through the contract method of financing. When
this occurs, the occupant normally purchases the property at a contract
price far above its fair market value. The price he pays has been
2 A discussion of such lossesis presented by Marc Fried in "Grieving for
a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation," in James Q. Wilson (ed.),
Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, pp.
359—379.r
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inflated in part as a compensation to the seller for accepting a very low
down payment (if any), and for dealing with a buyer who has a credit
standing inadequate for obtaining a normal mortgage loan.
In contract sales, the seller often retains legal title to the property
until the buyer has made a great many payments. As a result, when
public authorities purchase a property at its fair market value, they
frequently pay the original seller, rather than the contract buyer. Since
the buyer purchased the property at an inflated price, the fair market
value paid by the government is almost always less than this purchase
price.
In such cases, the seller receives less from the government than the
buyer had agreed to pay him for the property. He may therefore hold
the buyer liable for the difference. If so, the buyer may find himself
still paying for the property—even after he has been ejected from it,
and even though he himself did not receive any payment for it. This
arrangement is clearly unjust; yet itis perfectly legal under present
legislation in many states.
On the other hand, the buyer can rarely be forced to pay the dif-
ference between fair market value and the sales price under these
circumstances. Either he does not have enough money for a court
judgment against him to be meaningful, or else the court will refuse
to compel him to pay under the circumstances. If the authorities are
aware of a contract purchase and know the name of the buyer, they
will often make both buyer and seller parties to the condemnation
suit. This allows the court to wipe out all of the buyer's residual
liability as part of the taking action. But the authorities do not always
know contract sales are occurring, since there may be no legal record
concerning the buyer until title actually passes.
When the government takes property obtained under a contract
sale after the buyer has obtained title, the government's payment may
be less than what he still owes on the property (which he has usually
by then refinanced with a mortgage). However, this is less likely than
the first occurrence described above.
In either circumstance, the government's taking causes an uncom-
pensated loss to the contract buyer. He has been purchasing the prop-
erty through monthly payments aimed at building up an equity in it.
Yet when that property is taken by the government, the payment made
for it is so small in comparison to his purchase price that all or nearly
2
allof his equity is eliminated. This negates any efforts he has made
in the well-established American tradition of saving money and in-
vesting it in the purchase of a home.Uncompensated Costs of Urban Renewal 75
COSTS OF SEEKING ALTERNATIVE LOCATIONS. Personsdis-
placed by highways must seek out alternative residential quarters. This
requires the investment of time and sometimes money. Some persons
are compelled to perform this search during working hours, and to
take on expenses they would not otherwise incur (mainly travel costs).
COSTS OF PAYING FOR ALTERNATIVE LOCATIONS. Anyone
forced to move his residence must immediately find another residence
elsewhere. In theory, if he initially lived in a residence worth $5,000,
he should be able to move to another worth $5,000 and thereby find
himself in substantially the same position he was before displacement.
But in reality,itis almost always impossible for residents in low-
income neighborhoods to find alternative housing elsewhere at the
same low cost they received from the government (if they were owner-
occupants) or at the same rent they formerly paid(if they were
renters).
The fair market value of low-cost homes condemned for highway
projects is normally lower than the current cost of similar dwellings
elsewhere for several reasons. First, the units condemned are often in
run-down and dilapidated condition. Second, they were usually built
many years ago. Therefore, they are obsolete in design, layout, and
amenities. Third, they are often located in the most undesirable neigh-
borhoods in the city (that is frequently why clearance is occurring
there). Most housing units elsewhere are therefore worth more on the
market. As a result, the owners of the units to be demolished cannot
take the payments they receive from the government and buy compa-
rable housing elsewhere without incurring additional cost. Or, persons
formerly renting homes which are demolished cannot find other homes
elsewhere available at equally low rents.
An example of this situation was recently revealed by a study made
of 112 displaced owner-occupied households in Baltimore. On the
average, each white household involved had to pay $2,500 more for
comparable housing elsewhere than it received from the government
for its original home, each nonwhite household, $3,900. Since the
original payments involved were $5,700 per household on the aver-
age, the "excess relocation cost" of $3,000 represented an average 53
per cent extra burden upon the households concerned.3
The degree of hardship resulting from these circumstances is greatest
among low-income households, especially those composed of older
Unpublished letter describing the results of a survey conducted by the Balti-
more Urban Renewal and Housing Agency.I-
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people. Persons owning expensive homes which are taken by the
government can find comparable housing elsewhere much more easily. 1
Newunits of similar quality and price are being constructed each year.
Moreover, such persons are generally more competent and experienced I
in seeking alternative housing. It is true that construction costs have
been rising so fast recently that even families in high-priced homes
cannot easily take the fair market value of their older homes and buy
new ones of comparable size, quality, and location. But it is certainly
easier for them to come close to this objective than it is for low-income
households. Little new low-cost housing is ever built in the United S.
Statesexcept in public housing programs. And those programs fall far I,
short of meeting the demand or the need for low-cost units. Conse- ii
quently, there is a perpetual shortage of low-cost housing in most large Ii
urban areas. b
The supply of such housing becomes enlarged only through the ii
gradual decline in the price of older existing units until they are eco- C
nomicallyaccessible to very low-income households—the "filtering
down process." But large-scale in-migration of low-income households v
into a given city, or a slowdown in new construction such as that ii
caused in recent years by high interest rates, can keep the demand for b
existing older units, and therefore their prices and rents, high. Hence
they remain beyond the economic reach of most low-income house- h
holds. In such a situation, poor persons who have been given only the
fair market value of their old homes find themselves unable to pur-
chase comparable housing elsewhere—or any housing at all—for the
same amount. For older persons no longer able to earn income, this
can be a tragic hardship. Often they have worked hard to pay off all
debt on the homes they were in so that those homes would provide
them with shelter for life. Then the government forces them out of
their homes, but pays them too little to buy any other housing else-
where. They have neither the savings nor the earning capacity to pay
the "excess relocation cost" necessary to find decent housing, and may
be driven into destitution through no fault of their own.
rc
By failing to pay residential households enough compensation so
that they can move into comparable housing elsewhere without loss to
themselves, the government is essentially passing some of the true
cost of the public improvement onto those whom it displaces. More-
over, this practice tends to injure most severely precisely the persons
least able to bear any injury at all. th,
To some extent, the higher cost of alternative housing accommoda-
tions results from the improved quality of those accommodations
relative to the original units occupied by displaced households. Nu- S1- UncompensatedCosts of Urban Renewal 77
merous surveys show that most such households relocate in dwelling
units which would be classified as "standard" under criteria developed
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Many of these
households were displaced from dwelling units which would be con-
sidered "substandard" by the same criteria. To the extent that these
displaced households live in better accommodations, it could be argued
that the higher costs they pay do not constitute a loss imposed upon
them by displacement.
On the other hand, this upgrading of housing quality is not neces-
sarily the result of voluntary choice. Prior to displacement, they may
have been living in substandard units which were relatively inexpensive
because they chose to minimize the share of their incomes going to
housing. After displacement, the share of their incomes devoted to
housing almost always rises, whether they want it to or not. Insofar as
improved housing quality is a result of involuntary restriction of their
choice, it is not clear that this can be considered a pure benefit not
requiring compensation. However, the improvement in housing quality
which accompanies increased housing cost does constitute a complicat-
ing factor in any attempt to evaluate how much compensation should
be provided in addition to fair market value.
This complicating factor is especially critical regarding renter house-
holds. Under present practices, displaced renters receive no compensa-
tion at all (except for moving costs in some states). A study of real
property acquisition in federally assisted programs made for the Con-
gressional Committee on Public Works in 1964 indicated that about
58.8 per cent of all displaced households and individuals were non-
owner occupants.4 A study of over 2,100 relocated households con-
ducted by the Census Bureau showed that a majority of rent-paying
households paid higher rents after displacement than before. More-
over, the fraction of their incomes devoted to rents rose, with the
median shifting from 25.1 per cent to 27.7 per cent. The proportion
of renter households paying over 20 per cent of their incomes for rent
rose from 67 per cent to 76 per cent.5 Thus, there is no doubt that
Select Subcommittee on Real Property Acquisition, Committee on Public
Works, U.S. House of Representatives, Study of Compensation and Assistance
forPersonsAffected by Real Property Acquisuion in Federal and Federally
Assisted Programs, Committee Print No. 31, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1965, p. 21. Henceforth this document will be referred to in both
the text and footnotes as the Public Works Committee Report.
U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, "The Housing of Relocated
Families: Summary of a Census Bureau Survey," in Wilson, op.cit.,p. 344.
Henceforth this document will be referred to as the Census Bureau Relocation
Study.I
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displacement generally forces renting households to pay more for rent, to s
even though many are paying very high fractions of their income for relo
housing already. (In the Census Bureau sample, over 35 per cent the
the nonwhites and over 24 per cent of the whites were paying more Moi
than 35 per cent of their incomes for rent both before and after dis-
placement.)6 Yet displacement also caused them to improve the qual- higi
ity of their housing, and even to occupy slightly larger units.T Deciding
to what extent these households were compelled to bear "excess re-
location costs" and to what extent they were merely upgrading their Los
housing is certainly not easy. Yet there can hardly be any doubt Del
that displacement forced these households to bear at least some uncom-
pensated costs which they would have avoided if they had been able to In I
doso.
the
MOVING COSTS. Clearly, transporting personal and other belongings cial
from the dwelling acquired by highway authorities to the new dwelling
costs resources. This fact is recognized by the law in most states. How- SiOE
ever, the Public Works Committee Report showed that only about 49.5 the
per cent of the households and individuals displaced per year by all pro
federally related programs received payments for moving costs.8 This mei
study also estimated that only about 44 per cent of the families and Mo
individuals likely to be displaced by federally related programs after inI
1964 would be eligible for moving-cost payments under the laws in the
force at that time. Thus, about 54 per cent of the owners and 59 per crel
cent of the nonowners forced to move would not be eligible for such
payments, although they would certainly incur moving costs.9
The average size of payment made to displaced families or individ-
uals for moving expenses was $119 under the highway program. This rei
was larger than the average of $64 under the urban renewal program rep
or $36 under the low-rent public housing program.'° den
owl
HIGHER OPERATING COSTS AT ALTERNATIVE LOCATIONS. In
many cases, living expenses (other than housing costs) at the location
to which displaced persons move are higher than at their original loca- site
tion. This is particularly likely concerning commuting costs if they have are:
had to move farther from their existing employment. The Census a
Bureau Relocation Study indicated that 37 per cent of the displaced Thu
workers surveyed who had fixed places of employment stated they had tiot
p.25. 5
Ibid.,pp. 340—341, 347—348. 10 Ibid., p. 37.
8 Public Works Committee Report, p. 24.Uncompensated Costs of Urban Renewal 79
to spend "much more time" commuting to work than they did before
for relocation. Only 13 per cent reported having to spend much less time;
•of the remaining 50 per cent spent about the same time
ore Moreover, households which have upgraded their housing involuntarily
may encounter higher operating costs, such as greater heating bills and
pal- higher property taxes.
Losses imposed upon Residential Households by Uncertainty and
ubt Delays
Inmany cities, considerable time elapses between the first designation
of a specific location for a highway or an urban renewal project and
the actual taking of property in that area. Moreover, even before offi-
cial designation, a long period of discussion about where each project
ng might go often takes place. During the entire time from initial discus-
sion to actual taking, the area concerned is strongly affected by both
the possibility and then the actuality of future clearance. Owners of
all property in the area are extremely reluctant to make costly improve-
his ments because they believe their property will soon be demolished.
nd Moreover, people outside the area are unwilling to purchase property
ter in it because they could only use it for a short period of time. Thus,
in the mere possibility that a highway or an urban renewal project will be
er created in a certain neighborhood produces a severe disruption of the
ch normal processes of property turnover and maintenance in that neigh-
borhood. Furthermore, once it has become relatively certain that a
d- highway or project will be constructed in an area, both commercial and
US residentialtenants begin moving out. Few others can be found to
replace them. This causes a decline in rates of occupancy in both resi-
dential and commercial property, and depresses the incomes of persons
owning that property.
En In many cases, all these consequences result from the mere discus-
sion of a given neighborhood as a potential right-of-way or project
a- site. But such discussion may last for several years before any specific
area is officially designated. So these consequences may seriously affect
a neighborhood which is not ultimately selected as the official location.
The owners who suffer such losses are not eligible for any compensa-
tion from the government, even though it caused their losses.
Specifically, property owners and residents in areas under discus-
1LCensusBureau Relocation Study, p. 350.I
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sion or actually designated as potential rights-of-way or project sites
normally suffer the following losses due to delay:
DETERIORATION OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN THEIR NEIGH-
BORH0OD. This occurs because many store operators depart, reduc-
ing the variety of facilitiesavailable, and many residents depart,
reducing the variety of persons living in the area. Furthermore, such
departures create vacancies which encourage vandalism, crime, and
physical dilapidation,
a
INABILITY OF PROPERTY OWNERS TO SELL THEIR PROPERTY
a
AT REASONABLE PRICES. Under normal circumstances, when a
family head is, say, transferred to another city, he sells his property
on the market for its fair market value. But when a given neighborhood p
is under the cloud of impending demolition, few persons are willing
to pay what was formerly the full fair market value for such property.
I.
Property owners are therefore confronted with a sharp depression in a
the prices they are able to receive for their homes. They are either
forced to sell at these depressed prices because they must move, or r
forced to remain in the area because they are unable to get a price corn-
mensurate with their investment in the property. Persons who sell and
move away also become ineligible for receiving any compensation
when the highway authorities begin purchasing property. Thus, the c
financiallosses they have been forced to endure by the highway are
completely ignored under current legal processes.
DECLINES IN PROPERTY VALUE BECAUSE OF THE NEIGHBOR-
HOOD DETERIORATION OCCURRING BETWEEN INITIAL DIS-
CUSSION AND ACTUAL TAKING. For the reasonscitedabove,
many properties decline in value once an area has been designated or
even begins being discussed as a highway or urban renewal site. But
in most states, the date at which fair market value is established is the
date at which court action is taken by the government to purchase the
property concerned. Many years may have elapsed from the time dis-
1 cussions of thissite began to this legally established date. So the
h neighborhood may have sharply deteriorated through the mere "an-
nouncement effect" of the highway or project. Nevertheless, some sales
probably have occurred in this area after such deterioration was far
advanced. These sales then become the basis upon which appraisers
C
establish fair market value, since appraisers use them to determine
what willing buyers and willing sellers are actually paying for propertyI
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in that area. Thus, property owners often receive from the govern-
ment far less for their property than they paid for it, and certainly less
than it was worth at the beginning of the process of discussion.
It is true that some owners of dilapidated and deteriorated residential
property look forward to takings by the government. Such takings may
"bail them out" of having to invest large sums in bringing their sub-
standard properties up to conformance with local building and housing
codes. For these owners, receiving even a relatively depressed price is
a blessing in disguise. However, owners of code-violating properties
are generally absentee landlords who are reasonably well-off eco-
nomically, since owner-occupants generally maintain their property far
better than absentee landlords. Thus, the small owner-occupants—
particularly those possessing or buying single-family dwellings—suffer
most from this.
LOSSES OF RENTAL INCOME. Owners of residential income property
are compelled to receive lower incomes than normal because many of
their tenants depart, and others are unwilling to replace them—unless
rents are reduced drastically. Moreover, higher maintenance costs
caused by vandalism induced by the resulting vacancies further reduce
the net income from such properties during the waiting period.
COSTS OF MAINTAINING PROPERTY AFTER IT HAS BEEN AP-
PRAISED. The appraised value of the property is based upon its
state of repair at the time of appraisal. But in some cases several
months may elapse between the appraisal and the legal action which
finally takes the property. During this period, landlords may have to
make certain vital repairs which do not appear in the appraised value
and for which, therefore, they receive no compensation.
Losses Imposed upon Residential Households Not Directly Displaced
But Located in Surrounding Areas
The impact of a major new expressway or urban renewal project is
hardly confined to those persons displaced by its construction. Many
other persons living or owning property nearby sustain losses because
of the new improvement (and others gain benefits). The most signifi-
cant of such losses can be described as follows:
HIGHER TAXES BECAUSE OF GREATER LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COSTS. The local government may incur added costs to prevent'1
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vandalism, increase police protection, and pick up additional debris
caused by the deterioration of the neighborhood during the waiting
period. These costs eventually cause a rise in property taxes or a
reduction in other local government expenditures. They may fall on
some of the displaced households themselves before they move, but
their primary impact is upon the remainder of the households in the
city.
DISRUPTION OF LOCAL COMMUNICATIONS BY BLOCKING MOVE-
MENT ON LOCAL STREETS. Unless a major highway is constructed
on stilts, it normally blocks movement on a large number of the local
streets formerly crossing its right-of-way. Urban renewal projects fre-
quently involve the closing of local streets and the rerouting of traffic
on more roundabout paths. Both these consequences decrease con-
venience of movement for local residents and others passing through.
REDUCTION IN THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF COMMERCIAL
4
ANDOTHER LOCAL SERVICES. Construction of a highway or an
urban renewal project often adversely affects the quality of life in
nearby neighborhoods by removing some of the facilities which served
them. These can include commercial establishments (such as stores and
restaurants), recreational areas, aesthetic attractions (such as trees),
local transit service (disrupted by the blocking of local streets), cul-
tural facilities (such as churches) and public education facilities. Not
only may some of these facilities be removed through demolition, but
also others lying outside the clearance area may abandon the neighbor-
hood because of its reduced population, or may deteriorate in quality
because of lower levels of patronage.
In many cases, the facilities removed were located in deteriorating
or dilapidated structures. Therefore, an upgrading of the physical con-
dition of the average commercial establishments may result. Neverthe-
less, a reduction in the number of such establishments and their
variety always decreases the choice available to remaining residents. C
When the facilities eliminated are in some way unique (such as an C
excellent school or a park), their removal may constitute an irreparable
loss to the community, greatly reducing its over-all attractiveness. Un-
der present legislation, no provisions are made for compensating the
remaining community for losses of this kind.
A
REDUCTION IN EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND INCREASED
COSTS OF COMMUTING. When industrial,commercial, govern-
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mental, or other employment-providing installationsare displaced
from an area, persons who formerly both lived and worked there are
compelled to become unemployed or to travel farther for available
jobs. Since most displaced establishments providing employment move
somewhere else, loss of employment is usually not required. However,
a relatively high proportion of small retail establishments in low-income
areas forced to relocate are not reopened elsewhere. This proportion
may run as high as 40 per cent, and usually exceeds 20 per cent.12
The jobs formerly provided by these establishments are completely
removed from the market. Since such establishments normally employ
local residents, the negative employment effects are concentrated in
the surrounding area. More significant in terms of number of persons
affected is the increase in travel costs to work imposed upon persons
who formerly both lived and worked in the neighborhood.
SPILLOVER IMPACT OF THE DETERIORATION IN THE CLEAR-
ANCE AREA. As noted above, significant deterioration often occurs in
the area where a highway or an urban renewal project will be located
during the interval between initial announcement of its location and
its final construction. The adverse impacts of such deterioration may
spill over into surrounding blocks. This may reduce property values
there, at least until the new improvement is actually in being.
INCREASED COMPETITION FOR HOUSING AMONG LOW-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS. When major public projects are constructed in rela-
tively high-density low-income neighborhoods, they may require the
destruction of thousands of dwelling units within a given city. Such
destruction causes a net decline in the number of housing units eco-
nomically available to relatively low-income households. If this effect
is not offset by increases in the inventory of housing available to low-
income households elsewhere in the metropolitan area, the same num-
ber of such households as before will be competing for a reduced supply
of housing units available in the price ranges they can afford. Theoreti-
cally, this will tend to raise the rents paid by all low-income house-
holds. The extent to which this theoretical effect is quantitatively sig-
nificant in reality will depend upon the factors listed below.
a. The number of housing units destroyed by the public project in
comparison with the total number of units available to low-income
households in that area. Statistics concerning public projects in Balti-
more illustrate the nature of this effect. In 1960, there were an esti-
12 Public Works Committee Report, p. 30.I
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mated 95,000 housing units within the city limits of Baltimore occu-
pied by low-income households(thatis,those with incomes low
enough to be eligible for public housing). About 64 per cent of these
were renter-occupied and 36 per cent were owner-occupied.13 In the
period from 1951 to 1964, about 10,000 housing units in Baltimore
were demolished because of various public programs, including high-
ways and urban renewal.14 Data concerning how many of the house-
holds displaced were low-income households are not available. An
informed but arbitrary estimate is that 75 per cent had low incomes.
In that case, about 7,500 low-income housing units were demolished
in this thirteen-year period, or about 7.8 per cent of the entire low-
income housing inventory as of 1960. This is slightly less than one per
cent per year. Consequently, such demolition would not seem likely to
exert a very large upward pressure on rents in the remaining inventory.
b. The degree to which displaced households actually have access
to low-income housing units elsewhere in the metropolitan area. In
most large cities, racial segregation effectively prevents many Negro
households from having access to relatively low-rent or low-cost units
located in all-white neighborhoods. Yet a high proportion of the house-
holds displaced by public programs are Negro. For example, the
Census Relocation Survey selected a sample by getting the names of
allfamilies relocated by 163 local public agencies in the United
States from June 1 through August 31, 1964. Of the 2,300 families
finally interviewed from this sample, 52.6 per cent were nonwhite.15
Since this sample includes local public agencies in many smaller
communities, the proportion of nonwhites is probably much higher in
larger cities. This conclusion is borne out by data from the particular
larger city I have been citing. From 1951 through 1964, 89 per cent
of all households displaced by public projects in Baltimore were Negro
households.'° In 1960, the total inventory of housing in Baltimore
occupied by low-income Negro (nonwhite) households amounted to
about 43,000 In the period from 1951 to 1964, about 8,900
Negro households were displaced by public programs. Assuming one
housing unit was demolished for each displaced household, this means
that such demolition equalled about 20.6 per cent of the entire housing
inventory occupied by low-income Negroes in 1960. The average of
13U.S.Census Bureau.
BaltimoreUrban Renewal and Housing Agency, Displacement and Reloca-
tion—Past and Future (for the period 1951 through 1964), March 1965. Hence-
forth this document will be referred to as the BURHA Report.
CensusBureau Relocation Study, p. 337.
BURHAReport. U.S. Census Bureau.
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890 units demolished each year equaled about 35 percent of the
additional number of nonwhite households entering the Baltimore
housing market each year because of net nonwhite population growth
in the decade from 1950 to 1960.18 Thus, when data for the key seg-
ments of the housing market are examined in isolation, the possibility
that demolition connected with public programs might cause upward
pressure on rents and prices in the remaining relevant sections of the
housing inventory seems much greater than if data for the housing
market as a whole are used.
c. The rate at which the supply of housing available to low-income
households (and in particular, those being displaced) is being expanded
through new construction or the "filtering down process." The third
factor in turn depends to a great extent upon whether the local housing
market is in a relatively "loose" or "tight" condition. A "loose" hous-
ing market is one in which new units are being added to the total
inventory faster than new households are entering or being formed in
the area. As a result, the total available housing supply is increasing
more rapidly than total demand, causing a downward pressure on both
prices and occupancy rates. Under these circumstances, the "filtering
down process" works relatively (but not absolutely) rapidly. House-
holds in the middle- and upper-income ranges have many housing
alternatives open to them. Therefore they more quickly upgrade their
housing, thereby making a larger number of units available to lower-
income families.
Conversely, a relatively "tight" housing market is one in which the
demand for housing is rising faster than new supply is being created
through construction (net of demolition). In such a market, increased
t competition for both the new housing units being created and the
existing housing inventory creates an upward pressure on rents, prices
and occupancy levels. Vacancies decline, and middle- and upper-income
households find it more difficult to upgrade their housing. As a result,
) fewer existing units "filter down" to low-income households. Then
e demolition of some of the housing units already available to such house-
S holds because of a highway or a renewal project will have a far more
g serious impact upon rents for low-income households than when the
market is "loose."
Low-income households are particularly vulnerable to shifts in the
relative "tightness" of the housing market. They occupy the residual
part of the housing inventory not claimed for use by higher-income
households. Since the latter have more money with which to bid for
18U.s.Census Bureau.I
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housing, their shelter needs are satisfied in the best partofthe inven-
tory. Moreover, new housing is almost always added to the upper-
income end of the market, because cultural and other restrictions
embodied in building codes and zoning regulations prevent the con-
struction of new housing at low enough cost so that low-income house-
holds can afford itJ9 These two considerations emphasize the depend-
ence of low-income households upon the "filtering down process" as a
source of additional available housing supply.
The housing situation of low-income households has been worsened
in the past two years by a sharp drop in the number of total new
housing units started in the United States. In the period from 1962
through 1965, an average of 1.54 million new housing units were
started each year. But in 1966 only 1.25 million units were started,
and in 1967 only 1.29 million units. This reduction of about 18 per
cent in new housing starts occurred because of higher interest rates in
the economy, rather than any reduction in the demand for new hous-
ing. In fact, the demand for housing has been stimulated by high-level
prosperity. The resulting combination of rising demand and restricted
additions to supply has created a very "tight" housing market in most
metropolitan areas. This has caused a decline in vacancies and an up-
ward pressure on rents at all levels of the market. Consequently, the
"filtering down process" has recently become a less efficient method of
making new housing units available to low-income households.
The impact of a significant demolition of low-income housing units
in a given neighborhoodismagnified by the relativelyrestricted
mobility of low-income households. Numerous studies have shown
that members of many low-income households typically spend much
of that part of their lives lived in the city within areas circumscribed
by a very few blocks. As a result, they are relatively unfamiliar with
19 The only exceptionis public housing. Itisjust as expensive as private
housing to build, but is subsidized sufficiently so that low-income households
can afford it. But the supply of public housing in the United States is very small
in comparison with the number of low-income households. Since 1937, about
780,000 low-rent dwelling units had been created by public housing programs
through 1966. However, in 1966 there were over 11 million households classi-
fied as having incomes below the "poverty level" as defined by the Social Se-
curity Administration. Thus there were approximately fourteen times as many
poor households (including both families and individuals) as there were public
housing units in 1966. The ratio of poor households to public housing units is
considerably lower within certain central cities. Nevertheless, itstillis fair to
say that the number of public housing units in any major city in the United States
is far below the number of households either eligible for such units, or desirous
of living in them. This is confirmed by the long waiting lists for entry into
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housing alternatives available in distant parts of the metropolitan
area. This is particularly true of Negroes because racial discrimination
excludes them from many portions of the housing market. When such
low-mobility households are displaced from their homes, they restrict
their search for new housing to other areas nearby. Thus, the increased
competition for low-cost housing created by demolition for public
projects does not spread itself out evenly across the entire housing
market. Rather it becomes focused most sharply on other relatively
low-income neighborhoods in the immediate vicinity of the clearance
areas. Consequently, demolition of what seems to be a relatively small
number of housing units in comparison with the total number in the
metropolitan area may still have a significant impact upon rents and
occupancy in low-income neighborhoods surrounding the demolished
houses.
However, it is extremely difficult to measure this impact accurately.
The effects of the pressure on rents and prices from this source cannot
be separated from similar pressures from other sources (such as a
general rise in the price level).
REDUCTION OF THE EFFICIENCY OF COMMUNITY FACIL-
ITIES SERVING SURROUNDING AREAS. Schools, churches, stores,
and other facilities near the clearance areas may be forced into less effi-
cient operation by both the demolition of residences and the creation of
the new projects. This can occur for either one of two opposite reasons.
First, the reduction in their clientele or patronage may cause them to
operate at an inefficiently low scale. This can adversely affect not only
commercial establishments like retail stores, but also churches, social
organizations, public schools, and medical facilities. This occurs when
a significant proportion of the clientele of an organizationisre-
moved from the area, but the organization itself remains because it
lies outside the clearance area, or the organization is cut off from con-
venient accessibility by its patrons. In contrast, if a public facility lies
within the clearance area and is demolished, the diversion of its
former load onto some nearby facility may overload that facility. An
example would be removal of a public school and the diversion of its
pupils to another already crowded school nearby. In either case, the
reduced efficiency of the facilities concerned imposes a cost upon
residents who live near but not within the clearance area.
CHANGES IN RELATIVE ACCESSIBILITY. The purpose of a major
highway isto improve the mobility of a large number of personsI
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residing within the metropolitan area concerned. By altering the rela-
tive accessibility of different parts of the metropolitan area, such a
highway has a dramatic impact on land values. The values of certain
sites rise sharply (such as sites lying near major interchanges and
easily accessible to them). The values of other sites fall just as sharply
(such as sites lying along former main arteries which lose traffic once
the new highway is opened). These losses occur in all parts of the
metropolitan area, not just in neighborhoods through which the high-
way itself passes. This impact is unique to highways, and does not
result from urban renewal projects.
LOSSES RESULTING FROM THE PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTION.
Building a major public improvement often has a very disruptive effect
upon the immediate vicinity. Local traffic is impeded both by added
congestion and by the blocking of movement due to construction. The
local government has to pay increased costs for traffic control and for
the creation of alternative access paths. Businesses on surrounding
streets lose sales because access to their property is diminished and
heavy traffic congestion discourages patronage. Noise and vibration
associated with construction may disrupt productive processes in near-
by industries and generally lower the quality of the environment.
Under present laws, no compensation is paid for all of these losses,
even when they are substantial.
LOSSES RESULTING FROM INCREASED UGLINESS, NOISE, AIR
POLLUTION, OR OTHER ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES.
Public projects—particularly highways—often produce certain adverse
changes in their immediate environment which reduce property values
of adjacent parcels. For example, major expressways generate constant
noise, higher levels of localized air pollution from exhaust fumes, the
glare of lights at night, and increased congestion on some local streets
near interchanges (but reduced congestion on others). Urban renewal
projects may cause greater traffic congestion because of a higher pro-
portion of car use among the new residents than the original ones and
diversion of traffic. Even the sheer aesthetic effect of a major public
improvement may influence nearby property values—usually downward
in the case of major highways, and upward in the case of completed
renewal projects (though perhaps downward during the waiting period
before such projects are finished).
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Distinguishing Between Real Resource Losses and Redistributional
Effects
Some of the 22 nonconstruction costs cited above represent real ab-
sorptions of resources caused by highway and urban renewal projects.
Examples are moving costs, losses caused by the process of construc-
tion, and costs generated by increased vandalism during periods of
delay. But certain other costs cited previously do not involve resource
absorption. Rather, they are redistributions of wealth from some house-
holds to others. Examples are higher rents or housing prices because
of increased competition for housing among low-income households
resulting from displacement, and losses in property values due to
changes in the accessibility of various parts of the metropolitan area.
For each household which suffers from these costs, other households
gain corresponding (though not necessarily identical) benefits. Thus,
when rents for low-income households rise, tenants suffer but land-
lords benefit. And when property values fall in some area that has
reduced relative accessibility, they rise in another area where such
accessibility has been improved by the project concerned.
Welfare economists have long argued that these two kinds of costs
must be distinguished from each other in making public decisions.
Actions that absorb resources represent real costs that must be taken
into account in deciding the allocative efficiency of undertaking some
project. But actions that merely redistribute resources from one house-
hold or group to others represent distributional effects that are irrele-
vant to efficiency, as that term is used by welfare economists. Rather,
such distributional effects are relevant to the equity of the project
concerned.
All welfare economists agree that efficiency should be a key factor
in determining public (and private) investment decisions. But whether
such decisions should be based solely upon efficiency grounds, or upon
both efficiency and equity grounds, is a matter of some dispute. In my
opinion, equity effects are just as important as efficiency effects in de-
ciding whether to undertake a project. However, exactly how these
two types of effects should enter into particular decisions is an ex-
tremely complex subject which cannot be fully discussed in this paper.
In fact, this paper focuses exclusively upon the questions of equity
and justice relevant to residential households which arise from the
nonconstruction costs generated by highway and urban renewal proj-
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ects. But the redistribution effects relevant to equity can result from
both actions that absorb resources and those which merely shuffle them
around among different households. Therefore, I have had to discuss
both kinds of costs or losses here. However, I have not distinguished
between them insofar as their relationship to resource-allocation ef-
ficiency is concerned. I am not concerned here with the allocative
efficiency of highway or urban renewal projects at all, and will not
discuss or refer to that important and complex subject any further.
IV. Application and Modification of the Basic
Principle of Compensation
Why Compensation Should Not Be Paid for All Losses
In reality, it is neither desirable nor possible to provide direct public
compensation for all of the costs and losses discussed in the preceding
section. In some cases, the positive impacts of the highway or urban
renewal project tend to offset these negative losses insofar as individual
households are concerned. Therefore, the public improvement in-
herently tends to "make people whole" even if no specific public com-
pensation is paid to them. In other cases, there is no practical way of
"making people whole" for the losses they suffer. Finally, there are a
variety of losses which itis proper for the public to disregard for
several different reasons. All these factors are discussed briefly below.
THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME LOSSES WILL BE OFFSET BY
BENEFITS FROM THE PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS. As mentioned
above, many land parcels gain greatly in value because of the increased
accessibility provided by each new highway, or the local environmental
improvement provided by most new urban renewal projects. This ef-
fect may offset some of the losses caused by the public improvement
concerned. For example, increased ease of access to distant shopping
centers may compensate automobile-driving local residents for the loss
of some local community facilities. (Since most low-income residents
do not own automobiles, this benefit has a relatively restricted distribu-
tion, however.) Similarly, if a completed urban renewal project greatly
increases the number of high-income households in the neighborhood,
it may attract new and more diverse shops and improve the quality ofUncompensated Costs of Urban Renewal 91
services available in the area. Also, the elimination of low-cost resi-
dences and commercial facilities through clearance tends to reduce
competition among those remaining, and may thereby enhance their
value.
It is certainly true that the exact distribution of these benefits is
notlikely to be the same as the exact distribution of the costs and
losses described earlier, even for a limited set of specific parcels (such
as those near the project itself). Nevertheless, public authorities are
legitimately entitled to take these benefits into account when trying to
decide which types of losses should be directly compensated for.
WHY SOME LOSSES MUST BE CONSIDERED INESCAPABLE RISKS
OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP. Dynamic change is one of the funda-
mental characteristics of a free enterprise economy. It inevitably pro-
duces unexpected and unforeseeable increases in the value of some
properties, and equally unexpected and unforeseeable declines in the
values of others. To some extent, such changes must be regarded as
inherent in a successful free enterprise system. Hence thereis no
reason why the government or anyone else should guarantee continu-
ance of existing property values as of any given moment.
It is true that governments adopt many policies specifically aimed at
stabilizing values for whole classes of property, or entire areas. For
example, zoning laws have this function. Yet even zoning laws do not
protect the owners of every individual parcel from possible variations in
value due to dynamic factors which influence the relative desirability of
his neighborhood, or even of his parcel (such as the creation of a weird
modern-design house by the man across the street).
In reality, major public improvements constitute only one of the
many factors which change property values. Others include purely
private developments (such as new housing or industrial plants),
natural events (such as hurricanes and earthquakes), changes in tech-
nology and over-all economic demand (such as replacement of coal by
petroleum for many uses, and the subsequent replacement of petroleum
by nuclear energy) and social and cultural trends (such as the increased
popularity of skiing).
Insofar as major urban highways and urban renewal projects are
concerned, their impacts upon property values can be arbitrarily divided
into diffusedimpactsupon properties in all parts of the metropolitan
area, and locally concentrated impacts upon properties immediately ad-
jacent to the improvements concerned, or almost that close. The diffused
impacts can properly be considered as another of the many dynamicI
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effects influencing property values which are inherent in a growing and
changing economy. Therefore, the government need not compensate the
myriad individual property owners who lose from this process, any
more than it imposes special taxes upon those who gain. The losers
can expect to pay lower property taxes if their property actually declines
in value and this is reflected in assessments, just as the gainers can
expect to pay higher property taxes for the opposite reason.
But the locally concentrated impacts are far more likely to be both
larger in proportion to total property value, and more easily traced to
the specific public improvements concerned, as opposed to all other
factors. Hence a reasonable case could be made, for example, for corn-
pensating property owners along a highway right-of-way for losses in
value due to increased noise, ugliness, air pollution, and night glare.
However, if such compensation is paid to locally concentrated losers,
then it would be equally just for locally concentrated gainers to pay
special taxes to offset their windfall capital gains. The absence of both
these devices can be considered indirect evidence that the public
affected prefers to risk suffering uncompensated losses in order to have
a chance to benefit from unrecaptured gains. This is especially likely
since total gains presumably outweigh total losses, or the improvements
would not be made. Moreover, the difficulties and costs of computing
precisely who gains and who loses from such property-value shifts, and
by how much, are another strong argument for ignoring either positive
or negative compensatory action, as is discussed below.
A dynamic economy similarly imposes certain psychological costs
upon those living in it. Stable relationships are continually being dis-
rupted or affected by the changes inherent in such an economy. A
private apartment house developer is not expected to pay for the
psychological costs he imposes on previous tenants at a site where he
buys some old tenements which he demolishes, replacing them by a new
apartment project. Private developers are expected to pay the fair
market price for the properties concerned, but not all of the other costs
associated with change in any situation. Consequently, it would be un-
reasonable to expect the government to compensate every person who
experiences a psychological loss because of the creation of a new public
project, since it is part of the dynamic process of change inherent in
social progress.
THE DIFFICULTIES OF MEASURING LOSSES OF CERTAIN TYPES.
Some of the losses which have been described earlier cannot be ac-
curately measured in such a way as to make compensation of the in-
.4*
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dividual households concerned truly practical. Three specific difficulties
connected with measurement are delineated below.
a. Nonmeasurability. There are no accurate methods of quantifying
certain costs (or benefits), particularly psychological ones associated
with the disruption of existing relationships. It is not possible, there-
fore, for the state accurately to assess the degree of such loss and com-
pensate those concerned. This is particularly true because the only
persons capable of assessing the loss—the persons affected—have a
natural motive for exaggerating that loss if compensation is offered.
b. Nonseparability. Certain kinds of costs (and benefits) can be
measured, but they embody composite effects of the public project and
other forces at work in the economy. It is often not possible to dis-
cover how much of these effects can be accurately attributed to the
project, and how much must be attributed to other forces. For example,
increases in the value of any given land site can be caused by the im-
pact of a project, by increases in population, by general inflation in the
price level and by a host of other factors. Hence, it is extremely difficult
even to estimate to what extent the public project is responsible for the
increase (or decrease) of land values which occurs in a given period.
c. Nonaccountability and wide individual variation. Certain types of
costs are measurable and separable but difficult for public authorities to
account for accurately, particularly because they are subject to wide
individual variation. For example, the amount of time spent looking
for alternative quarters can vary tremendously from individual to in-
dividual. It would be quite possible for each person to keep track of that
time, and for authorities to place a value on each time unit. But ex-
cessive individual variations, plus a tendency toward overreporting
flowing from the natural interest of each person to maximize his com-
pensation, would make complete compensation for every individual im-
practical and undesirable.
There are three basic methods of coping with the difficulties of
measurement described above. The first is overlooking the costs con-
cerned altogether. This is especially appropriate when the losses in-
volved are probably not large for each individual concerned on the
average. Second, standard estimates can be used as proxies for losses
which are either nonaccountable or nonmeasurable. Third, public
authorities can undertake actions aimed at providing benefits which
tend to offset certain costs generated by the highway. For example, if
public authorities created one new housing unit accessible to low-
income households for every demolished unit occupied by a low-income
household, and the new units were similar to the old in size and stylet
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and ownership, then no upward pressure on rents or occupancy levels
would be generated by the reduction in the supply of housing available
to such households. Rather than attempting to measure the highly
diffused losses caused by the highway, the authorities would nullify
them by creating offsetting benefits. Such compensatory actionis
probably the only way to counteract costs which are diffused and
probably small in each individual case, but occur over a great many
cases.
The Tests Which Losses Must Pass to Be Directly Compensable
Any practical policies of compensation must take into account both the
basic principle described in the first part of this report and the modifica-
tions set forth above. The result should be a set of practical policies de-
signed to pay people direct compensation whenever the losses they
sustain meet certain key tests. These tests can be summarized as follows:
1. Attributability: the loss concerned is in fact caused by the public
project or the relocation generated by it, rather than by other
economic or social forces.
2. Significance: the loss is relatively large both absolutely and in rela-
tion to the economic capabilities of those persons who suffer it.
3. Noninherent Riskiness: the loss cannot be considered an ines-
capable risk of property ownership, or an inevitable price of
progress in a dynamic society.
4. IdentifIability: the individuals or class of persons who suffer the
loss can be personally identified.
5. Measurability: the magnitude of the loss can be measured or es-
timated with reasonable accuracy, at least sufficient to design
roughly offsetting beneficial actions.
6. Deliverability: compensation made for the loss by public author-
ities can be accurately directed at those who suffered that loss,
whether they are individuals or an entire class of persons, and
will not be received by others who did not suffer any such loss.
7. Net Negative Impact: the loss is not likely to be offset by benefits
resulting from the public improvement and like'y to be distributed
in the same way as the loss itself.
It is clear that these tests represent value judgments rather than the
application of purely scientific, economic or legal principles. Hence they
are inescapably arbitrary. Yet, in my opinion, a compensation policy
based upon both justice and practical feasibility will include corn-
II
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pensation for all losses which pass the above tests. Regarding all losses
which do not pass these tests, I believe they are either not deserving
of compensation, or else no practical means of providing it can be ar-
rived at. However, my judgments are certainly open to argument and
modification.
The Types of Losses Which Pass These Tests, and Therefore Should
be Compensable
The table set forth on an accompanying page shows all of the specific
types of losses due to highways or urban renewal described earlier in
this paper. It indicates which of these losses pass the seven tests men-
tioned above. The table also shows which tests are failed by those losses
which do not pass all seven tests, and whether or not those which do
pass are compensable under existing laws and regulations.
It should be emphasized that the judgments expressed in this table
are partly subjective in nature. Therefore, they are open to dispute on
nonscientific grounds. Moreover, these judgments are not based upon
the professional expertise of lawyers, but rather the inferences of
economists. So they are certainly subject to further modification. How-
ever, they have been set forth here as a tentative start toward a more
systematic development of public compensation policies than is em-
bodied in present laws and regulations.
Based upon the findings set forth in this table, six of the twenty-two
specific types of losses described earlier in this report are subject to full
compensation, and four others to partial compensation. Eight of these
ten losses are not now considered compensable under existing laws and
regulations. Hence the analysis we have presented has led to con-
clusions quite divergent from existing compensation practices, as will
be further explored below. The ten fully or partly compensable losses
can be divided into four basic types.
1. Compensation paid directly to individuals displaced for non-
waiting costs, including: (a) Payment of the fair market value of
real property taken as of the time of the taking; (b) Payment for
some of the losses of investment resulting from specific financing
arrangements not accounted for in the computation of fair market
value; (c) Payment for the "excess relocation costs" of acquiring
or renting alternative property; that is, the costs of such acquisi-
tion or renting in excess of fair market value or previous rentals
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2. Compensation to owners of property for costs created by delays in
the project, including: (a) Estimated losses of fair market value
occurring between the time a site is officially adopted and the
time the legal proceedings are made against individual property
owners; and (b) Estimated costs of maintenance and repairs made
between the time of final appraisal and actual taking procedures.
3. Compensation to the housing market in general to offset the im-
pact upon rents and prices of a reduced inventory of dwellings
available to low-income households. This would consist of the
provisionofadditional dwelling units by publicauthorities
(whether built by them or paid for by them and built by private
interests) so as to counteract the increasing "tightness" of the low-
income household market caused by demolition of housing units
formerly available in that market. The number, size and type of
units which would be made available by public authorities in
comparison to the number demolished would depend on par-
ticular housing conditions in the area concerned, including the
degree to which racial segregation restricted the accessibility of
the existing inventory to members of racial minority groups dis-
placed.
4. Compensation to the neighborhood in general and the property
owners in areas lying outside the clearance area, including: (a)
Payments for disruptions connected with the construction of the
highway itself; (b) Provision of additional public facilities and
services to offset facilities demolished in order to create the high-
way (such as public schools); and (c) Payments to adjacent or
nearby owners to offset losses in value due to increased noise,
ugliness, air pollution, or other adverse environmental effects.
V. The Seriousness of the Injustice Resulting from
Failure to Pay Such Compensation
The fact that governments fail to pay compensation for losses they in-
flict upon certain residential households does not in itself indicate that
present compensation policies should be changed. No social institution
perfectly conforms in practice to what it should do theoretically. In
many cases, society endures such behavioral imperfections because
their consequences are not serious. Those consequences neither con-Uncompensated Costs of Urban Renewal 99
stitute a great injustice for any sizable group, nor waste significant
amounts of resources that could be more effectively used, nor threaten
the rest of society with dire consequences. Correcting such imperfec-
tions is often not worth the cost in terms of legislative, administrative
and general public attention, even if it might produce some net economic
benefits or greater justice.
Therefore, in order to assess the policy implications of government's
failure to pay compensation for the losses that I have indicated are
properly compensable, it is necessary to estimate roughly the nature
and magnitude of that failure's consequences.
The Concentration of These Losses Among Low-Income
Minority-Group Households
The losses caused by urban highways and urban renewal for which no
compensation is now paid are not spread evenly throughout the nation's
population. By their very nature, they are concentrated upon the house-
holds which these public programs displace, and other households living
close to the clearance areas involved. But these public programs tend
to select locations where a high proportion of low-income, minority-
group households reside.
This is true for four reasons. Three result from the fact that such
households have a high proclivity for living in the oldest and most
dilapidated housing in each metropolitan area, particularly within
central cities. They do so because such housing is the least expensive
available, and they are poor. Also, their choice of alternative locations
—particularly in the suburbs—is restricted by ethnic discrimination in
housing markets.
Urban highways and urban renewal projects are concentrated in
areas where such housing is found because:
1. City planners often use these programs as a means of getting rid
of the oldest and least desirable housing in the existing inventory.
This is one of the explicit functions of urban renewal, which can
only be done in relatively deteriorated areas.
2. The oldest housing is usually found in close proximity to central
business districts, since U.S. cities (like most others) developed
outward from the center. But major highways also focus on the
area peripheral to central business districts because that is the
optimal location for certain traffic arteries skirting or serving the
downtown area.
jI
100 The Analysis of Public Output
3. Property in these areas is less expensive than elsewhere, since it is
older and more dilapidated. Therefore, routing highways through
such neighborhoods reduces total acquisition costs—especially
since so many of the true costs of displacement are not borne by
the government but by the households displaced.
4. Members of low-income ethnic minorities have not in the past
been organized enough politically to oppose the routing of high-
ways through their neighborhoods, or the location of urban re-
newal projects there. In contrast, higher-income residents and
owners of industrial and commercial property generally have the
organizational and financial capability, and the political connec-
tions, to offer strenuous opposition to the location of these public
improvements in their neighborhoods. This has happened in
dozens of cities across the country, from Beverly Hills to Cam-
bridge. To at least some extent, highway and urban renewal of-
ficials responsible for selecting routes and sites are naturally moti-
vated to follow the geographic path of least political resistance.
Until recently, that path has often run directly through the lowest-
income neighborhoods.
As a result of these factors, almost all urban renewal projects, and a
great many inner-city segments of federally assisted highway systems,
either have been constructed, or are planned for, sites and routes in
low-income, minority-group neighborhoods, particularly Negro areas.
As the recent report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders clearly established, the residents of these neighborhoods
include many of the poorest and most deprived citizens in the nation.2°
To concentrate the uncompensated losses resulting from urban high-
ways and urban renewal upon them is triply unjust, as well as socially
dangerous. It is triply unjust because these households are the least
able to pay such costs, derive the least benefits from the projects con-
cerned, and are already unfairly compelled by society to bear heavy
burdens resulting from racial discrimination and segregation.Itis
socially dangerous because the residents of these areas have recently
begun to react violently to their conditions of life, and may be stimu-
lated to further violence by the injustices of society's failure to pay
proper compensation for the losses described earlier
In most cities, government officials are not likely to ameliorate the
loading of these uncompensated losses upon low-income minority
20Seeespecially Chapters 7 and 8 in the Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, Washington, D.C., March 1968.
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households by rerouting highways into wealthier areas. The "political
heat" from such rerouting would be too great. Nor are they likely to
shift urban renewal projects out of low-income neighborhoods, because
the legal requirements for eligibility require concentrating them in such
neighborhoods. Therefore, this kind of unjust concentration of losses
can be avoided only by ceasing to construct such public projects alto-
gether, or providing adequate compensation for the losses involved.
Rough Estimates of the Magnitude of Certain Key
Uncompensated Losses
But how large are these uncompensated losses? If they are relatively
small, then perhaps they will not stimulate disorder. Nor will they
create any more injustice than a thousand of the other essentially
irremediable frictions that are inescapable in a large modem society.
Thus, at least a rough quantitative analysis is crucial in assessing the
policy implications of these losses.
The number of households likely to be displaced by all urban
highways and urban renewal projects has been estimated by the Public
Works Committee Report. About 96,400 households (including both
families and individuals)will be displaced each year from 1964
through 1972. This includes all urban renewal displacement, and 82
per cent of all highway displacement (since 18 per cent of highway
displacement in the past few years has been in rural areas)
Inpast urban renewal displacement, about 27 per cent of all dis-
placed households were individuals, and 73 per cent were families.
The median-size displaced family contained 3.0 persons.22 If these
figures are applied to future urban displacement for both highways and
urban renewal, then about 237,200 persons per year would be dis-
placed by these programs. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that
at least an equal number of persons in surrounding areas are likely to
be affected by some of the costs described earlier. Thus, in the eight
years from 1964 to 1972, a total of about 3.8 million persons would
be unfairly compelled to pay costs associated with displacement result-
ing from these two programs—including 1.9 million who would be
directly displaced. Although this total constitutes less than 2 per cent
of the entire U.S. population, it is clearly a significant number.
21PublicWorks Committee Report, pp. 260—261.
22WilliamL. Slayton, "The Operations and Achievements of the Urban Re-
newal Program," in Wilson, op. cit., p. 212, and the Census Bureau Relocation
Study, p. 339.
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Estimating the magnitude of uncompensated costs imposed upon
these persons is much more difficult than estimating the number of
persons involved. However, a few rough calculations can be made.
1. About 61,300 renter households will be displaced each year in
urban areas by highways and urban renewal.23 Displacement will
compel most of these households to pay higher rents. The Census
Bureau Relocation Study estimated that median rents for families
(excluding individuals) were raised by relocation from $65 per
month to $67 among nonwhites, and from $68 per month to $83
among whites.24 The federal government has proposed compen-
sating such renter families by granting a lump sum equivalent to
a monthly rent subsidy over a two-year period. The monthly
subsidy would equal the difference between the family's rent after
relocation in standard housing and 20 per cent of its monthly
I am not familiar with the logical justification for this
particular compensation formula. Perhaps a better one could be
conceived. But for purposes of initial estimation, I have used it.
Employing the median incomes of relocated families for 1964
reported in the Census Bureau Relocation Study, and assuming
that 53 per cent of all relocated families would be nonwhite, I
calculated a weighted average total compensation of $221 for
each renter family displaced. I further assumed that individuals
should receive the same compensation as families. (Even though
individuals pay lower rents, they also have lower incomes.) Under
these assumptions, the annual cost of compensating all displaced
renter households for being compelled to pay higher rents would
be $13.5 million.
2. About 35,100 owner-occupant households will be displaced each
year in urban areas by highways and urban renewal.26 In order
to buy housing of quality comparable to that from which they
were displaced (or somewhat superior), these households will
have to pay a premium over the fair market values of their
original homes. The Public Works Committee Report indicates
the fair market values of a sample of 26,900 homes purchased
by various government authorities in clearance operations were
as follows: 27
Public Works Committee Report, pp. 260—26 1.
24 Census Bureau Relocation Study, p. 345.
25Public Works Committee Report, pp. 141—142.
26 Ibid.,pp.260—261. 27 ibid.,p.22.




I assumed that the average value of all homes under $6,000 was
$4,000; the average value of those from $6,000 to $15,000 was
$10,500; and the average value of those over $15,000 was
$20,000. These assumptions yielded a weighted average fair
market value of about $10,500. The relocation study in Balti-
more cited earlier indicated that the average premium paid by
home owners with relatively low-valued homes was about 53 per
But the premium for higher-value homes is likely to be a
lower percentage. Therefore, I arbitrarily calculated the average
premium for all future home-owner relocations at both 30 per
cent and 50 per cent. The total compensation required to offset
such premiums per year would thus be $110.6 million at 30 per
cent, or $184.3 million at 50 per cent.
3. The destruction of 96,400 housing units per year in urban areas
by highways and urban renewal will reduce the supply of housing
available there, especially for low-income households. This will
tend to drive up the cost of housing (either owned or rented) for
thousands of households who are not displaced, as well as for
those who are displaced. Owners will gain from this effect, since
the values of their properties will rise. But renters will suffer,
since they will have to pay more. However, it is impossible to
measure accurately the increase in rents which each individual
nondisplaced household will have to pay because of this supply-
reduction effect. Therefore, I believe the only practical way to
compensate them is to offset the drop in supply caused by dis-
placement by building new housing available to low-income
households. In "tight" housing markets, such an offset might
require building one new unit for every one demolished. In
"loose" housing markets, very little new construction might be
required. It is extremely difficult to estimate accurately the re-
quirements for such an offset for the nation as a whole. A crude
estimate is that one new unit should be constructed for every two
units demolished. If the average unit so constructed cost $15,000,
then the total capital cost of building 48,200 units would be
$723.0 million per year.
However, it would be possible to provide incentives for private
28Seefootnote 4.r
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investors to put up all of this capital. The government would have
to furnish subsidies that would virtually guarantee a successful
market for such housing at a reasonable rate of return. Use of a
below market interest rate subsidy would not enable the very
lowest-income households to afford such housing. But it would
make it available to most displaced households. I have assumed
the government would underwrite 6 per cent interest by borrow-
ing money with 6.0 per cent bonds and lending it at zero per cent
interest. If 40-year financing is used, this form of subsidy would
involve a cash outlay of $623 per unit per year. Therefore, crea-
tion of 48,200 units per year would require an annual subsidy of
$30.0 million.
It is not certain, and may even be unlikely, that the cost of thus
preventing nondisplaced renters from suffering injuries from a
reduction in housing supply would equal the size of the injuries
they would sustain if no prevention occurred. Yet there is no
simple way to estimate the size of these injuries; so I will arbi-
trarily assume they equal the cost of preventing them.
4. The Public Works Committee Report estimatesthat about
20,520 households per year to be displaced by highways will not
be covered by programs providing compensation for moving
costs.25 (All households displaced by urban renewal will be cov-
ered by such programs.) The average payment for moving
expenses made to those households displaced by highways who
actually received such payments was about $1 If this same
average payment is extended to an additional 20,520 households
per year, the annual cost will be $2.4 million.
The above calculations do not cover all of the uncompensated costs
likely to be imposed upon residential households in urban areas by
highways and urban renewal. However, I believe they encompass the
largest of those uncompensated costs. The total amount required to
provide compensation for those discussed above would range from
$156.5 to $230.2 million per year, depending upon the size of the
premium which displaced owners would have to pay to obtain com-
parable housing elsewhere.
Thus, present practices in urban areas regarding residential house-
holds displaced by highways and urban renewal projects will unfairly
impose uncompensated costs of at least $156.5 to $230.2 million per
29 Public Works Committee Report, p. 26.
30 Ibid., p. 37.
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year upon approximately 237,200 displaced persons and atleast
another 237,200 nondisplaced persons. In my opinion, this represents
injustice on a massive scale. It amounts to an uncompensated loss
averaging from $812 to $1,194 per household for each of the estimated
192,800 households involved. The median income of these house-
holds is probably around $4,000 per year.3' Therefore, the average
uncompensated loss which each is compelled to suffer amounts to
confiscation of from 20 to 30 per cent of one year's income. Admit-
tedly, the calculations upon which these conclusions have been based
are extremely crude. Yet I believe they are more likely to be too low
than too high. How much proportionally would paying proper com-
pensation for these costs add to the present nonconstruction costs of
urban highways and urban renewal? Expected compensation for all
real property—residential and nonresidential—to be acquired in urban
areas under these two programs is estimated at $1.084 billion per
year from 1964 to 1972 by the Public Works Committee Report.82
This does not include moving and other relocation costs. But those
costs are undoubtedly smaller than the costs of acquiring nonresi-
dential property. So this figure is a high estimate of all costs which
will be paid to displaced residential households under current com-
pensation practices. Adding the estimated costs of paying compensa-
tion for the specific losses quantified above would increase this total
by from 14 to 21 per cent per year.
VI. Conclusion
It is clear that present compensation practices related to residential
households displaced by highways and urban renewal are grossly
unfair. Those practices in effect shift a substantial part of the true costs
of acquiring property for these improvements onto the residential
households they displace and others nearby. These households are
forced to bear from 14 to 21 per cent of the real costs of acquiring
urban residential land for such improvements. This injustice results in
forcing relatively low-income families and individuals to bear heavy
financial burdens which really ought to be paid by society as a whole
or by the specific beneficiaries from the improvements concerned.
Public policies which clearly cause massive injustice should be
31 Census Bureau Relocation Study. p. 338.
32 Public Works Committee Report, pp. 252—253.106 The Analysis of Public Output
changed as soop as possible. Therefore,I believe the authorities
responsible for urban highways and urban renewal projects should
immediately begin detailed exploration of practical methods for cor-
recting these undesirable results of their past and present behavior.
These methods should include finding means of calculating the magni-
tude of each presently uncompensated loss suffered by each house-
hold concerned, and means of either paying proper compensation for
such losses, or taking actions which will offset their effects.
Some suggestions for achieving these objectives have been made
in various parts of this paper. Yet the real purpose of this paper has
been to indicate the nature of the problem, and to prove that itis
large enough to demand immediate remedial action. If it has succeeded
in this purpose, then the complex and difficult work of devising such
action should soon begin.
ACOMMENT
by B U R TO N A. WE IS B ROD, University of Wisconsin
Within the last decade or so, economists concerned with government
investment expenditures have focused increasing attention on the
distributive effects, as well as the allocative efficiency, of projects.
Anthony Downs has made a useful contribution to this continued
development. We cannot concern ourselves with efficiency alone if we
expect to address real-world problems and decisions. Equity considera-
tions are also relevant to government decision making.
It is in this context that I see Downs' paper; indeed, in his opening
paragraph we read that "widespread injustice" results from the failure
of public policy to take nonconstruction costs of urban highways and
urban renewal into account, and from the failure to compensate those
who bear such costs—particularly when the costs fall upon low-income,
disadvantaged persons. "Injustice" is the name of the Downs' story,
and "compensation" is its hero.
Now the plot. Downs sets forth twenty-two kinds of losses imposed
upon residential households that are affected either directly or in-
directly by the construction activities or the accompanying displacement
and relocation. He does not consider the losses imposed on non-
residential units—business firms—and this strikes me as a notable
omission. I suppose, however, that Downs is less concerned about
effects on business on the grounds that they are less needy of assistance.
I am not so certain, especially when small retail establishments are
concerned.
My opening remark suggested that I am more than sympathetic
to the increased emphasis on distributional equity in the evaluation
of public expenditure programs. Economists' now-traditional emphasis
on efficiency—Pareto optimality—and disregard of equity on the
grounds of the controversiality of value judgments cannot endure if
we are to address ourselves to the real world. But neither should we
go too far in the opposite direction, disregarding efficiency. It is in
connection with the relationship between equity and efficiency that
Downs' paper is not sufficiently clear, and, in some respects, is mis-
leading.
Throughout this truly instructive paper Downs repeatedly empha-
sizes his concern about justice and equity—which, he states, requireI
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the compensation of losers for a number of forms of losses resulting
from urban renewal and highway construction. Although his concern
in this paper is with equity alone, he implies that the interests of equity
and efficiency do not conflict.
My concern is this: in providing his catalog of losses associated with
these urban construction projects, Downs has tended to take a particu-
lar and partial point of view—primarily that of the low-income house-
holds affected. A general-equilibrium analysis would disclose, how-
ever,that while some of the losses are realsocialcosts,others
are income transfers. From the standpoint of the individual being hurt,
this distinctionis irrelevant. But not so from the standpoint of a
government decision maker who is concerned with allocative efficiency
as well as equity. The point, which I shall illustrate below, is that we
may wish—on equity grounds—to compensate persons who are
adversely affected by income-redistributional side effectsof public
actions, but we should recognize that redistributions are not real-
resource costs and, thus, the amount of redistributions should not
normally be counted among the project costs when the project's effi-
ciency is being considered. If compensation for socially unwanted
redistributions is to be made—and Downs argues that such redistribu-
tions can frequently be made—then a highway or renewal project
should be evaluated solely in terms of its allocative efficiency (inclu-
sive of costs of administering the compensation). Even if compensation
payments are not made, it would be an error to include the "losses"
from redistributional side effects among program costs without also
considering the redistributional "benefits" to those who gain.'
'In the revision of his paper, subsequent to the conference, Downs recognizes
the difference between allocative efficiency and distributional equity, and he
acknowledges the relevance of the distinction for policy purposes. He now states
explicitly that his concern in this paper is exclusively with "equity and justice,"—
not with allocative efficiency—and this clarification is helpful.
The point that Downs does not make quite clear, however, is that there are
two senses in which distributional equity consequences should be considered: (1)
After a decision has been made to undertake a project; in this situation a strong
case can be made (on equity grounds) for compensating the losers, especially
when the losers are, to begin with, largely among the disadvantaged. But (2)
before a decision has been made as to whether a project will be undertaken, the
nature of the redistributionsit would cause should be understood so that a
decision can be made either to compensate the losers or to regard the absence of
compensation as a disadvantage (cost) of undertaking the project. In the latter
case the problem remains of devising a metric for making these distributional
effects commensurable with real resource costs, in order that the over-all "grand
efficiency"of the project can be assessed.[For further discussion see my
"Income.Redistribution Effects and Benefit-Cost Analysis," in S. B. Chase, Jr.
(ed.), Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis, Washington, D.C., 1968, pp.
177—209.1r f
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There are a number of illustrations of Downs' failure to distinguish
real losses from redistributions. Four of them pass all of his seven
tests for determining whether compensation should be paid. These are
numbered 3, 5, 18, and 19 (see Downs' Table 1). Each of these—
to be analyzed shortly—is indeed a source of loss to certain individuals;
but the losses to these people constitute only one side of the income-
redistribution effects. Perhaps the bearers of these losses should be
compensated; this is a value judgment issue, of course, though, for
what itis worth, I share Downs' concern about adverse side effects
upon low-income persons and especially upon low-income Negroes.
Regardless of whether compensation is paid, however, the "losses"
(or amount of the compensation) should not be added to real resource
costs to determine total project costs. (To be sure, they should be
added to determine total project expenditures.) For if this addition
were carried out, and if decisions on whether or not to undertake a
particular project were based on a comparison of such "total" ex-
penditures with expectedbenefits, some investments which were
actually socially efficient would fail to be undertaken. I have argued
elsewhere that if compensation cannot be made, then the net welfare
loss resulting from the undesired income redistribution should be
taken into account by government decision makers.2 But this net
welfare loss is overstated by the dollar amount of the gross income
transfer, as long as the benefits to beneficiaries count at all.
Since some of the losses discussed by Downs are real external dis-
economies of urban renewal and highway projects, while others are
income redistributions, further analysis of the various losses is required.
I shall examine four.
"Losses Due to Home Financing Arrangements" (Downs' Loss
#3). The loss identified here is the consequence of a high-risk home
buyer paying a risk premium for a house (what Downs refers to as
"contract method of financing"). When public authorities pay the
"fair market value" for a home, Downs tells us, they often pay less
than the contract purchase obligation, since the latter reflects the
risk premium; hence, a loss is imposed on the purchaser.
This "loss," however, does not reflect a resource cost; it is, in effect,
a lump sum tax or transfer of wealth away from the house occupant
and to the seller of the contract, assuming that the occupant must
eventually pay the seller the difference. Or itis a transfer in the
opposite directionifthe selleris unable to collect the difference.
Regardless of our value judgments regarding the equity of either type
2ibid.,pp. 178—184.
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of transfer, the amount of the transfer is not properly additive to the
resource costs for the purpose of assessing the economic efficiency of
the project.
"Costs of Paying for Alternative Locations" (Loss #5). This loss
to displaced persons results insofar as "the fair market value of low-
cost homes condemned for highway projects is. ..lowerthan the
in.
current cost of similiar dwellings elsewhere...." AsI understand
the point, such a difference results when there occurs a nonmarginal ad
decrease in the housing stock of "low-cost" housing. For then the th
price of remaining housing can be expected to rise. Thus, if displaced
home owners were paid a "fair market value" based on housing prices
prior to the destruction of part of the supply, the owners would be
paid less than the cost of replacement. This change in housing prices,
it seems to me, is also the source of Loss #18,"Increased Competition th
for Housing Among Low-Income Households," for the increase in ge
prices of low-cost housing presumably is felt by all low-income persons, re
not only by those being displaced.
There is no doubt that whenever urban renewal and highway con-
struction do destroy nonmarginal portions of the low-cost housing ai
stock, prices of the remaining stock can be expected to rise. If "fair di
market value" disregards this, then all occupants of low-cost housing, tii
and all persons displaced from it, suffer a loss. Moreover, although
Downs does not say so, the losses are not restricted to the low-cost w
housing segment; the initial increase in housing prices at the low-cost
end of the spectrum will filter upward in response to the altered rela-
tive prices among housing of various quality.
These losses to low-income persons renting housing or to low-income L
home owners displaced by the renewal or highway project are "pecuni- m
ary" losses—transfer payments; they have their precise counterparts til
in pecuniary gains to owners of the remaining housing stock. We may
deplore such a redistribution of income or wealth, but it should
be recognized as a redistribution. We may wish to compensate the
losers (and, perhaps, tax the gainers), but the allocative efficiency
of the project is not affected by a decision to pay compensation. The
amount of the compensation should not be added to the resource
el costs of construction and land acquisition for the purpose of assessing
the benefit-cost relationship, although the administrative cost of mak-
ing the compensation payments and collecting the taxes is relevant.
It seems clear that Downs sees the change in prices of low-cost ca
housing as the principal concern, for nearly half of his discussion of
the 22 forms of lossesis devoted to this point (Losses #5 andc
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#18). Thus, itis quite important that the transfer payment nature
of these "losses" be recognized.
A brief comment is also in order regarding Loss #19, the "Reduc-
ss tion in the Efficiency of Community Facilities Through Loss of
I- Patronage or Overloading." There are really two points here—one
involving the loss of patronage, the other involving overloading.
Id Downsillustrates the "loss of patronage" point by reference to the
al adverse effects on "schools, churches, stores, and other facilities near
the clearance areas [that] may be forced. ..tooperate at an in-
efficiently low scale." These losses, however, are not real costs; they
represent sunk costs, which, as such, ought to be irrelevant to current
investment decisions, though not to the compensation issue.
Downs illustrates "overloading" costs by the crowding in schools
n that may result as displaced people relocate. Such crowding or con-
n gestion—to the extent that it occurs—is a real external cost of urban
renewal and highway construction. These costs should be counted
when the efficiency of the particular project is being considered.
The real external costs of urban construction programs presumably
g are disregarded by public decision makers—and it is clear that such
r disregard is inconsistent with efficient decision making. At the same
time, external real effects of urban construction are not limited to
public programs. Private construction programs have similar effects,
which are ignored no less by private decision makers than by govern-
ment officials. When an old building is torn down to make way for a
• new private office or apartment building, these displaced residents also
incur losses because of disruption of personal relationships (Downs'
Loss #1), the need to search for substitute housing (Loss #4),
moving costs (Loss #6), and many of the other forms of loss iden-
tified by Downs. Income-redistributive side effects also result from
private programs, just as from their public counterparts.3 As a result,
caution is required lest constraints be placed unwittingly on public
decision makers that would bias the allocation of resources away from
the public sector and toward the private. In a world of second best,
allocative neutrality between public and private sectors can be an
• elusive goal.
Finally,I would like to comment on some of Downs' empirical
Because eminent domain proceedings cannot be used for private projects, we
can assume that adverse effects on owners of property required for private
projects will be reflected in sale prices. Nevertheless, third-party effects—of which
Downs discusses quite a few—presumably are not taken into account by private
decision makers any more than by government planners.C-.
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estimates and accompanying suggestions for methods of making corn- hi
pensation payments. He points out, helpfully, that even when compen- el
sation seems desirable, we should also investigate the cost of deciding hi
which specific persons should be compensated, and in what amounts.
In the end, the benefits of compensation—whether in terms of effi-
ciency or justice—might be smaller than the costs.
When we come to the matter of how much compensation to pay, I rc
cannot agree with Downs that the increased housing expenditures el
made by displaced persons after relocation are an adequate measure V
oftheir welfare loss and, hence, of the compensation required to off-
set the loss, One reason—though not the most important—is that the F,
government's purchase of owner-occupied residences eliminates the bi
home owner's costs of search for a buyer. I assume that at any point
intime there are some home owners who would prefer larger, more
expensivehousing but who fail to act because of the burdens of find- C]
inga suitable buyer for their present home and searching for a new 111
home.When such home owners sell to the government they may be
expected to seek more costly housing. This represents no welfare loss
at all—quite the contrary.
But there is a more serious objection to measuring the welfare loss
by the increased expenditures for housing. Downs argues that urban
construction activities destroy low-income housing, thereby causing
its price to rise. This is another way of saying that a shift in relative
prices occurs—with housing becoming more expensive. A rational
consumer would adjust to the new relative prices, possibly by increasing
or decreasing the amount he spends on housing. In either event he
would suffer a welfare loss. The point, then, is that the welfare loss—
which presumably serves as the justification for compensation pay-
ments—may be badly estimated by changes in expenditure levels.
As noted already, Downs is also concerned about the effects of a
reduced low-cost housing supply or. nondisplaced households, who
can expect to pay increased rents. Finding it "impossible to measure
accurately" the size of increases, Downs proposes that compensation
take the form of a government financial stimulus to construct low-cost
housing to replace the housing destroyed. I am not persuaded. It
would seem better to determine the cost of implementing this pro-
posal, and then to use this sum to make cash payments to low-income
households—thus providing them with the choice of whether to use
the money for housing or for something else.
Notwithstanding my lack of agreement with some of Downs' efforts
at estimating the size and form of compensation payments, I whole-
L•1
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heartedly applaud his effort. There is a need for much more research
effort to develop generalizations about which groups of people are
hurt by public expenditure programs, which are benefitted, and in what
,g amounts. Downs has made a fine start with respect to urban renewal
and highway projects.
Identifying the losers from public projects would not only facilitate
realization of equity objectives, but could also contribute to more
efficient decisions. The failure to compensate losers can produce a
vocal opposition group; in a one-man, one-vote political context this
can spell long delay, if not defeat, even for highly efficient projects.
e For this reason the interests of equity and efficiency will sometimes
e be served simultaneously. Nevertheless it is important that those corn-
pensation payments that offset redistributional side effects of public
e programs not be viewed in the same way as those that reflect real
external costs—even though their impact on the government budget is
indistinguishable.
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